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Background: The biases jurors possess may 
influence everything from the interpretation of 
case evidence to impressions of the defendant to, 
ultimately, verdict and recognition of this has led 
to a number of juror attitude scales attempting to 
tap into important biases. A common ideology 
discussed in legal research is that individuals 
attitudes toward the law and the legal system differ 
along a continuum moving from due process (a 
concern for the preservation of individual rights) 
to crime control (a focus on swift and harsh 
punishment for those who break the law) although 
an agreed upon assessment of these perspectives 
has yet to be created.  
 
Purpose: The current research addresses due 
process and crime control perspectives and uses 
the ideology as a source for a new measure of juror 
bias: The General Attitudes toward the Legal 
System (GALS) scale. 
 
Setting: Not applicable. 
 
Intervention: Not applicable. 
 
Research Design: The GALS scale was 
constructed based on existing theory and 
administered to nearly 700 undergraduate 
psychology students at a large Midwestern 
university. The psychometric properties of the 
instrument were then evaluated to determine 
instrument quality.  
 
Data Collection and Analysis: The Rasch 
Rating Scale Model (RRSM) was used to evaluate 
the psychometric properties of the GALS. 
Evaluation focused on six characteristics of the 
instrument: dimensionality, reliability, rating scale 
quality, item quality, item hierarchy, and measure 
quality. 
 
Findings: Results indicate the GALS is a 
psychometrically sound instrument for measuring 
juror bias.  
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wo individuals sit side by side, listen 
to the same information, and apply 
the same instructions to their task. 
Afterwards, they meet to discuss and 
realize that not only have they reached 
different conclusions, they have very 
different interpretations of the 
information. An American jury is 
composed of up to twelve of these 
individuals. The same reason that the jury 
system works in the United States is also 
why it may fail, and why it generates so 
T
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much research. Asking jurors to hear a 
case is interjecting human nature into the 
legal process. 
The possible effects of bias in the 
courtroom often drive suggestions to 
reform or limit the use of juries (Hans & 
Appel, 1999). Research has shown that 
personality characteristics and attitudes 
can affect how a juror perceives trial 
information and decides a verdict (Casper, 
Benedict & Perry, 1989; Fitzgerald & 
Ellsworth, 1984; Hastie, Penrod & 
Pennington, 1983). For example, jurors 
who are pro-prosecution, and unable to 
set aside this attitude, may have a decision 
of guilt that begins at a level closer to 
conviction than to acquittal. Presumably, 
less evidence would be required to secure 
a guilty verdict in such persons than if 
jurors are pro-defense or if they apply no 
weight to their initial biases (Ostrom, Saks 
& Werner, 1978). 
In cases where attitudes may exert an 
influence, the best predictor of juror bias 
is attitudes toward specific, key elements 
of the case (Lieberman & Sales, 2007). For 
example, when a lawyer has been accused 
of a drug-related offense good predictors 
of guilty verdicts are attitudes toward 
drugs and attitudes toward lawyers 
(Moran, Cutler, & Loftus, 1990). In the 
same respect, attitudes toward rape is a 
good predictor of the verdict in a rape case 
(Field, 1978) and endorsement of myths 
about battered women is a good predictor 
of the verdict when such women are 
accused of murdering their batterers 
(Vidmar & Schuller, 1989). This is in line 
with Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1977) review of 
research on attitudes and behavior 
showing that if researchers want to use 
attitudes to predict behavior, their best 
bet is to focus on specific attitudes toward 
that behavior. 
Information integration theories 
suggest that one of the initial components 
affecting juror decision-making is an a 
priori bias relevant to beliefs about the 
legal system (Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974; 
Ostrom et al., 1978). In testing this theory, 
Kaplan and Miller (1978) pre-identified 
respondents as being supportive of either 
harsh or lenient treatment toward law-
breakers before exposing them to trial 
information. This “general bias” of jurors 
played an important role in decisions of 
guilt, such that those pre-identified as 
harsh were more likely to convict and 
were more punitive than were those 
identified as lenient. While on the surface 
this may seem to violate Ajzen and 
Fishbein’s (1977) contention that general 
attitudes are poor predictors of specific 
behaviors, Kaplan and Miller (1978) 
actually showed that it was the attitude’s 
effect on a larger range of behaviors that, 
cumulatively, were predicting verdicts. 
This “general bias” concept is 
important because many of the 
differences in attitudes toward the legal 
system have underlying similarities; 
specifically, general attitudes about the 
state and purpose of the criminal legal 
system. The goal of the present paper is to 
show that those different viewpoints 
regarding the “is” and “ought” (Packer, 
1964) of the criminal legal system can be 
defined and measured. We do so by 
capitalizing on a theoretical distinction 
between two conceptions of the goal of the 
legal system, first advanced over 40 years 
ago by law professor Herbert Packer, and 
termed the due process model and the 
crime control model (Packer, 1964).  
 
Due Process and Crime Control 
Attitudes 
 
Packer’s (1964; 1968) distinction between 
a due process and a crime control 
perspective suggests a template that 
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society uses to assess the justice system. 
He proposed that the state of legal affairs 
in the United States, and the ideological 
differences between its citizens, may be 
summarized as falling somewhere in 
between two extremes. At one end of the 
spectrum is crime control, and with it the 
idea of the swift hand of justice, and at the 
other end is due process and a vigilant 
attempt to preserve individual rights. 
For crime control, what is important is 
the finale and accordingly sanctioning 
those who commit crimes. The crime 
control model has a low tolerance for the 
adjudicative process. If a case has been 
thoroughly investigated then it is safe to 
assume the suspect is likely guilty. This 
“presumption of guilt” (Packer, 1964) is 
what will allow the system to move in a 
more expeditious manner. 
According to this perspective, a perfect 
legal system would allow criminal 
investigations as much freedom as 
possible, demand efficiency and 
thoroughness in these investigations, 
advocate swift punishment if the 
investigation has deemed there is enough 
evidence to assume the individual in 
question is probably guilty (or expeditious 
exoneration if it is determined the 
defendant could not possibly be guilty), 
and employ adequate deterrents of future 
crime (generally in the form of harsh 
punishments).  
On the other hand, the old adage that, 
“It is better for ten guilty men to go free 
than for one innocent man to suffer an 
injustice,” is the foundation of the due 
process model. The tolerability for error is 
low. If there are any qualms about the 
guilt of an individual then that person 
should go free. In the crime control 
model, allowing investigators to use all 
necessary power to determine factual guilt 
is the goal of the legal system. The due 
process model makes a distinction 
between those who are factually guilty and 
those who are legally guilty (Packer, 
1964). Whether or not the individual 
actually committed the crime is 
secondary. What is important is whether, 
through legal means and by preserving 
individual rights, a valid adjudicative 
process finds that individual guilty.  
Due process does not condone crime 
nor does endorsement of this perspective 
equal a view that crime is not a problem in 
society (Packer, 1964). Instead, 
recognition of potential problems in 
criminal investigations (e.g., faulty 
eyewitness identifications and coerced 
confessions) and in legal proceedings 
(e.g., biased witnesses and inadequate 
counsel) suggests that we should never 
assume a case closed. Still, Packer 
suggests that the due process orientation, 
as he proposes it, is not void of affect, 
strictly concerned about preserving 
individual rights. He describes how a due-
process leaning may promote anti-
authoritarian views and a distrust of the 
players in the legal system. 
 
Assessing Due Process and 
Crime Control 
 
Even with knowledge of the two 
perspectives (and the face validity of the 
assumption that people differ along this 
dimension), attempts to evaluate whether 
the distinction actually exists have been 
scarce. 
The first step is to define exactly what 
one means by a due process and crime 
control distinction. Those addressing the 
topic have used Packer’s (1964) outline of 
the models as a starting point (Thompson, 
Cowan, Ellsworth, & Harrington, 1984; 
Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984; Liu & Shure, 
1993). 
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A simplistic view in assessing these 
perspectives is an assumption that we can 
define due process or crime control by 
their correlations with other attitudes (see 
Fitzgerald and Ellsworth, 1984, for their 
interpretations of previous surveys 
assessing public attitudes); in other 
words, proposing the definitions of due 
process and crime control a posteriori 
from observing the relationships between 
attitudes concerning the death penalty, 
pro-prosecution or pro-defense standings, 
authoritarianism and conservatism (see 
Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984). 
The research on death-qualified jurors 
indicates that attitudes toward the death 
penalty relate to attitudes toward other 
aspects of the legal system (Fitzgerald & 
Ellsworth, 1984). Death-qualified jurors 
are pro-prosecution, suspicious of 
defendants, distrusting of defense 
attorneys, and unlikely to favor due 
process initiatives in the criminal justice 
system. Fitzgerald and Ellsworth suggest 
that this shows attitudes toward the death 
penalty predicted whether a juror was 
due-process oriented (focused on 
preserving individual rights in the justice 
system) or crime-control oriented 
(focused on swift, efficient justice). 
Liu and Shure (1993) believed that the 
ideas of due process based on Packer’s 
(1964) model did not clearly distinguish 
between due process as an ideological 
concept and due process as a basis for 
legal decision making. The authors 
propose that what researchers have been 
calling due process or crime control 
actually represents social and political 
ideas of justice when in fact these 
concepts are not necessarily related; 
specifically, due process attitudes do not 
always coincide with political liberalism. 
The example they provide is the American 
Civil Liberties Union’s—strong  
supporters of all that represents due 
process and preservation of individual 
rights—decision to support the right of a 
Nazi party to march in a pre-dominantly 
Jewish suburb of Skokie, Illinois. Liberals 
would not likely set aside their distaste for 
such a group in order to preserve 
individual rights.  
What Liu and Shure (1993) are 
suggesting is correct, but a strict legal 
definition of “due process” is not that 
defined by Packer’s (1964) model, nor that 
perceived by the general public 
(Thompson et al., 1984; Fitzgerald & 
Ellsworth, 1984). Packer (1964) states that 
a part of the due process perspective that 
is important, though often not 
acknowledged, is a “mood of skepticism 
about the morality and the utility of the 
criminal sanction, taken either as a whole 
or in some of its applications” (p. 20). 
Removing the emotional and ideological 
content from the due process and crime 
control orientation is ignoring important 
parts of the constructs, such as the anger a 
crime-control individual may feel when an 
offender is given a light sentence or the 
cynicism a due-process individual may 
feel when hearing about an illegal search.  
In their research, Liu and Shure (1993) 
found that strictly legal due process was 
not related to “due process/crime control” 
(as represented by 7 items from the 
Fitzgerald and Ellsworth (1984) scale and 
one new, similar item composed by the 
authors). Interestingly, the due 
process/crime control ideology based 
attitude assessment accounted for more of 
the overall variance in a scale combining 
this measure and the legal due process 
measure. The authors did not report 
which scale was a better predictor of 
overall verdicts for their simulated trial. 
While all of the previous studies 
focused on what effect crime control/due 
process attitudes may have on an 
individual juror, and the definitions of the 
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concepts (as ideologies) across the studies 
are near identical (Casper et al., 1989; Liu 
& Shure, 1993; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 
1984; Thompson et al., 1984), none of 
them have developed a valid measure 
built from the theoretical constructs to 
examine exactly how due process and 
crime control perspectives are structured 
and how they may relate to one another. 
The current paper addresses this topic. 
 
The Current Research 
 
One can think of the due process and 
crime control orientations as individual 
characteristics. A due process orientation 
represents a multitude of beliefs related to 
the law and to those involved in the legal 
system with the unifying characteristic of 
concern for individual rights. The same 
can be said of crime control beliefs and a 
concern for keeping order in the legal 
system. The content of these perspectives 
provides specific predictions about how 
an individual endorsing either perspective 
would react toward different aspects of 
the legal system; that is, due process 
individuals would frown upon illegal 
searches and seizures while crime control 
individuals would be disturbed if evidence 
indicative of guilt collected from the 
searches was deemed inadmissible. 
Assessing the due process and crime 
control attitudes of prospective jurors can 
help predict how they will react to 
different parts, and participants, of a 
criminal trial. 
 Various measures of juror bias have 
been validated over the years, including 
the Juror Bias Scale (JBS)(Kassin & 
Wrightsman, 1983; Myers & Lecci, 1998), 
the Legal Attitudes Questionnaire (LAQ) 
and Revised Legal Attitudes 
Questionnaire (RLAQ) (Kravitz, Cutler, & 
Brock, 1993), and the more recent Pretrial 
Juror Attitude Questionnaire 
(PJAQ)(Lecci & Myers, 2008). Although 
both the JBS and the PJAQ have shown 
predictive validity for individual juror 
verdicts—the JBS predicts around 3% of 
the variance in verdict decisions (Myers & 
Lecci, 1998) and the PJAQ predicts 
upwards of 7% of variance in verdict 
decisions (Lecci & Myers, 2008)—the 
development of the scales was not based 
in theory, and their content is very broad. 
Similar to the LAQ, which measures 
authoritarianism ideologies as they relate 
to the legal system and in a meta-analysis 
was shown to account for about 4% of the 
variance in a juror’s verdict (Narby, 
Cutler, & Moran, 1993), a measure looking 
at due process and crime control 
orientations would be theory-based and 
able to proffer a number of predictions for 
the future behavior of individuals 
endorsing the items. 
The existence of these current 
measures of juror bias does not preclude 
the utility of the new measure constructed 
for this study, the General Attitudes 
toward the Legal System scale (GALS). 
This new measure will tap into due 
process and crime control endorsement 
which, although often discussed in 
research and the legal realm (Casper et al., 
1989; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984; Liu & 
Shure, 1993; Thompson et al., 1984) and 
with generally agreed upon construct 
content, has not been empirically tested 
by its own, independent measure. The 
content of the crime control and due 
process perspectives offer predictions for 
individual differences at every major part 
of the legal system: attitudes toward 
police, investigation tactics, lawyers, the 
court, sentencing, constitutional rights, 
etc. With the theoretical constructs as a 
reference, one can tap into specific legal 
views that together create an overall 
conception of the legal system. 
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A total of 744 Introductory to Psychology 
students at a large Midwestern university 
in the United States filled out an online 
version of the GALS scale for partial 
course credit. The sample had been 
previously randomly divided in order to 
perform independent exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis for another 
purpose. For the 372 participants 
designated to the exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA), 12 participants were 
removed from the sample for answering 
“Neither agree nor disagree” to all items. 
Eight participants were removed from the 
372 participant confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) sample for the same 
reason.  
An ANOVA test was performed on the 
EFA sample to assess whether there was a 
difference in overall scale score for 
participants taking less than two minutes 
(N = 25, M = 109.3, SD = 12.8), between 
two and three minutes (N = 79, M = 
102.9, SD = 13.2), and three minutes or 
more (N = 256, M = 101, SD = 11.5). 
Results showed there was a significant 
difference with regard to how long a 
participant took to complete the survey (p 
< .01, η2 = .03). Post hoc analyses 
confirmed that those participants 
finishing in less than two minutes had 
overall scale scores significantly different 
from those spending three minutes or 
more (p < .01). For the EFA these 
individuals could be filtered out, but 
because the CFA was going to be 
performed with a statistics package that 
could not filter out these individuals, the 
27 individuals in this sample that took less 
than 2 minutes to complete the 
questionnaire had to be removed. When 
the data were recombined for the purpose 
of the current study—to utilize a Rasch 
modeling approach—a total of 697 




Items generated spanned multiple aspects 
of the legal system, including attitudes 
toward police and policing, lawyers, 
judges, jurors and general legal system 
concepts such as sentencing and parole. 
DeVellis’ (1991) guidelines for scale 
construction were followed and items 
were generated to directly assess the due 
process and crime control perspectives as 
they are commonly discussed and as they 
are defined by Packer (1964; 1968). As 
recommended for scale construction 
(Kerlinger, 1984), previous scales were 
consulted for item ideas including the 
Juror Bias Scale (Kassin & Wrightsman, 
1983), the Revised Legal Attitudes 
Questionnaire (Kravitz et al., 1993), 
Attitudes toward the Criminal Legal 
System (Martin & Cohn, 2004), the Scale 
of Attitudes toward the Legal System 
(Wrightsman & Schiffhauer, 1995), and 
Attitudes toward Entrapment (Butler & 
Wrightsman, 2002). Direct item 
adaptation from these scales was as 
follows:  
From Wrightsman and Schiffhauer’s 
(1995) Scale of Attitudes toward the Legal 
System the item, “Defendants who are 
guilty often “get off” because of 
technicalities” was changed to “Too often 
a defendant gets off because of 
technicalities.” From Kassin and 
Wrightsman’s (1983) Juror Bias Scale, the 
item “Out of every 100 people brought to 
trial, at least 75 are actually guilty of the 
crime with which they are charged” was 
adapted and changed to “Out of every 100 
persons brought to trial, at least 90 are 
actually guilty” and the item “Defense 
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lawyers really don’t care about guilt or 
innocence, they are just in business to 
make money” was adapted and changed to 
“Defense attorneys are only in it for the 
money” each trying to tap into a Crime 
Control attitude/affect or a Due Process 
attitude/affect. From Butler and 
Wrightsman’s (2002) Attitudes toward 
Entrapment scale the items “Use of 
informants (who pose as friends but 
actually work for the police) is allowable if 
that is what it takes to catch lawbreakers,” 
“The crime rate is so high that we should 
give the police the power to catch 
criminals, whatever it takes,” and “Police 
should be allowed to do whatever is 
necessary to catch those who are breaking 
the law” were adapted as is. 
For each statement, individuals were 
asked to indicate their agreement on a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from strongly 




Rasch models are routinely used in 
medicine, various health sciences, 
psychology and other fields to validate the 
psychometric properties of survey 
instruments. Traditional validation 
studies often involve summing and 
averaging Likert-scale data and treating 
the data as interval measures. This is a 
statistical violation as Likert-scale data 
are actually ordinal in nature. Raw scores 
are not measures; therefore, a linear 
transformation process must take place in 
order to produce a continuum that has the 
qualities of a true metric. Rasch models 
are generally considered a superior 
approach to analyzing survey data as 
ordinal raw score data can be converted 
into interval measures as logarithmic 
values of odds (logits) and overcome these 
important, and often overlooked, 
assumptions (Bond & Fox, 2007).  
 Rasch models are also widely 
acclaimed because they possess the 
property of invariance. Measurement 
scholars have long noted that students 
who receive a high test score may do so 
because they received an easy test. 
Conversely, those who performed poorly 
may have done so because they received a 
difficult test. Being able to separate a 
person’s ability from the instrument’s 
difficulty is both desirable and necessary 
for objective measurement. Traditional 
methods to analyze survey data do not 
possess this property, thus they are 
inherently sample-dependent. Rasch 
models, on the other hand, are able to 
separate a person’s ability (or other latent 
trait) and an item’s difficulty and map 
both on a linear continuum so that more 
meaningful inferences can be made.  
 All Rasch models assume a more able 
person should always have a greater 
probability of success on any given item 
than a less able person. Similarly, an 
easier item should always have a greater 
probability of being answered correctly 
than a more difficult item. This notion 
seamlessly transcends into survey 
research where a latent trait such as 
attitudes, perceptions, beliefs, etc. is 
measured instead of ability, per se. With 
Rasch models, a person’s response to an 
item is predicted based on the interaction 
between that person’s ability (or “severity 
of opinion” in the case of a questionnaire) 
and the question’s “difficulty to endorse”. 
The probability that a respondent will 
agree with a particular item is a logistic 
function of the relative distance between 
the person and the item’s hierarchical 
location on a linear continuum. Therefore, 
a participant who possesses a great 
amount of the latent trait would have a 
high probability of agreeing with an item 
that is relatively easy to endorse. 
Conversely, a participant who possesses a 
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small amount of the latent trait would 
have a lower probability of endorsing that 
same item.  
 Specific to this study, The Rasch 
Rating Scale Model (RRSM; Andrich, 
1978) was utilized for data analysis. The 
RRSM is a Rasch model that is 
appropriate for analyzing survey data that 
was collected using static rating scale 




where,  is the probability that person  
encountering item  is observed in 
category ,  is the “endorsability” 
measure of person ,  is the “difficulty” 
measure of item , the point where the 
highest and lowest categories of the item 
are equally probable.  is the “calibration” 
measure of category  relative to category 
1 , the point where categories 
1 	and	  are equally probable relative to 
the measure of the item. No constraints 
are placed on the possible values of	 . 
Winsteps (Linacre, 2010) 
measurement software estimated the 
parameters for the model using joint 
maximum likelihood estimation 
procedures (Wright & Masters, 1982). In 
the present study, person measures ( ) 
refer to the survey respondents’ tendency 
to endorse items based on their attitudes 
toward due process and crime control. 
Item measures ( ) refer to the difficulty 
of endorsing a particular item. Threshold 
measures ( ) refers to the difficulty of 
assigning a rating of  versus 1 on the 
rating scale. Standard errors are 
estimated for every person, item and 
threshold measure as well. Estimating 
parameters can be problematic when 
respondents heavily select extreme 
categories on the rating scale, so Winsteps 
adjust the raw scores by adding or 
subtracting 0.3 raw score points from 
either the zero score or perfect score. This 
adjustment properly parameterizes the 
measures (Linacre, 1999; 2010a; Wright 
and Panchapakesan, 1969).  
 The evaluation of the psychometric 
properties of the GALS scale focused on 
six criteria: dimensionality, internal 
consistency, rating scale category 
effectiveness, item quality, item hierarchy 
and person measure quality. First, to 
investigate dimensionality we performed a 
principal components analysis of 
residuals. This procedure is useful in 
identifying the amount of variance 
explained by each extracted principal 
component. Second, we performed 
reliability analyses to evaluate the degree 
to which the measures are reproducible. 
Third, we evaluated rating scale category 
effectiveness to determine if the rating 
scale was functioning properly. Fourth, we 
investigated item quality by examining 
item fit statistics. Fifth, we evaluated the 
item hierarchy to determine if the 
empirical hierarchy was consistent with 
theory-based expectations. Sixth, we 
evaluated person measures by 






A principal components analysis of 
residuals was performed by Winsteps 
measurement software to investigate 
unidimensionality. In total, 33.9% of the 
Rasch dimension was explained. The 
largest secondary dimension explained 
9.5% of the variance. Overall, the variance 
explained by the items was 30.5%. This is 
about three times the variance explained 
from the first contrast, thus indicating a 
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second dimension is present. The 
eigenvalue of the first contrast is 3.6, 
indicating it has a strength of about 4 
items (out of 25 total items). The Rasch 
dimension is strong enough to assert a 
significant primary dimension, however 
the strength of the second dimension is 
also somewhat noticeable. Considering 
this evidence, we consider the model to 




Reliability and separation measures 
indicate the extent to which scores are 
reproducible (see Table 1). Here, “Real” 
and “Model” reliability and separation are 
reported. Real reliability refers to the 
“worst case estimates”, and model refers 
to “best case estimates”; true reliability 
falls somewhere in between. Person 
reliability for this sample ranges from .66 
to .72, indicating moderate internal 
consistency. Item reliability estimates are 
stable at 1.00 indicating high item 
reliability. Separation measures indicate 
the number of statistically distinguishable 
levels in the data. Separation estimates 
ranging from 1.38 to 1.60 for persons 
indicates sufficient spread. Item 
separation measures of 14.33 to 15.10 also 














 Persons .74 .78  1.71  1.90 
 Items 1.00 1.00  14.33  15.10 
 
Rating Scale Effectiveness 
 
An investigation of the rating scale 
effectiveness involved evaluating the 
sample’s use of the rating scale and the 
scale’s inferential value (see Table 2). 
Linacre (2002) suggests a number of 
quality control checks to ensure adequate 
rating scale functioning. Counts and 
percents were provided to determine the 
extent to which the various rating scale 
categories were utilized by survey 
respondents. Infit and outfit mean square 
fit statistics indicate the extent to which 
each rating scale category is “noisy”, or 
producing calibrations that are not 
desirable for productive measurement. 
Structure calibration refers to the 
calibrated measure of transition between 
categories. Also called “step calibration”, 
this measure indicates how difficult it is to 
observe each category. Results indicate 
the sample aptly utilized the full rating 
scale. Fit statistics are well within the 
recommended ceiling range of 2.0, 
indicating relatively noise-free 
calibrations. Step calibrations advance 
appropriately from smallest to largest in 
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Rating Scale Effectiveness 
 









Strongly Disagree   792  5  .96  .98 NONE -2.79 
Moderately Disagree 1,796 11 1.05 1.06 -1.37 -1.43 
Slightly Disagree 3,073 19  .97  .97  -.87  -.66 
Neutral 3,622 23  .92  .92  -.29  -.06 
Slightly Agree 3,858 24 1.01 1.02   .03   .59 
Moderately Agree 2,066 13 1.03 1.04   .96  1.48 
Strongly Agree   843  5 1.03 1.02  1.53  2.93 
 
Item Measure Quality 
 
Item measure quality is determined by 
investigating the extent to which the items 
vary in difficulty to endorse, the size of the 
standard errors and the degree to which 
the items fit the model’s expectations (see 
Table 3). Item difficulty calibrations 
ranged from -1.14 to .92 logits, indicating 
adequate discrimination for data analyzed 
via the RRSM. Standard error estimates 
for each item were quite small, ranging 
between .03 and .04. As mentioned 
previously, fit statistics are useful for 
identifying noisy measures. Wright and 
Linacre (1994) indicate for rating scales, 
values of .6 to 1.4 are ideal, although 
values between .5 and 2.0 are not 
degrading for measurement. With regard 
to the present data, only one item stands 
out as being potentially problematic. Q1, 
In our legal system, everyone receives a 
fair trial, appears to slightly misfit the 
model’s expectations. Further qualitative 
investigation into this item is necessary 




Item Fit Statistics 
 





Q1 - In our legal system, everyone receives a fair trial .04 .03 1.65 1.65 
Q2 - Judges only take the facts of a case into 
consideration during sentencing .11 .03 1.18 1.18 
Q3 - Plea-bargaining allows too many criminals back 
on the street -.36 .03 .91 .91 
Q4 - People with more money are more likely to win 
their trials 
-1.14 .04 1.36 1.33 
Q5 - Lawyers will often lie to win their case -.72 .03 1.19 1.17 
Q6 - Prosecutors are only concerned with their -.13 .03 .80 .79 
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Q7 - Too many criminals are given lighter sentences 
than they deserve 
-.41 .03 .97 .96 
Q8 - Sentences given to racial minorities are often too 
harsh 
-.03 .03 1.04 1.05 
Q9 - Too often a defendant gets off because of 
technicalities -.37 .03 .67 .67 
Q10 - It is too easy for criminals to appeal their case 
and get off 
-.11 .03 .75 .75 
Q11 - Police often overstep their boundaries when 
pursuing a suspect 
-.22 .03 1.13 1.14 
Q12 - Defense attorneys are generally very honest .36 .03 .85 .88 
Q13 - Police will charge the first suspect that comes 
along 
.24 .03 .95 .95 
Q14 - Prosecutors are generally very honest .24 .03 .83 .85 
Q15 - Defense attorneys are only in it for the money .16 .03 .80 .80 
Q16 - It is too easy for a violent offender to be paroled -.34 .03 .73 .73 
Q17 - Out of every 100 persons brought to trial, at least 
90 are actually guilty 
.07 .03 .83 .84 
Q18 - If the police arrest someone, then that person is 
almost certainly guilty 
.92 .03 1.10 1.11 
Q19 - Too often a defendant is convicted on evidence 
that was collected illegally .04 .03 .71 .71 
Q20 - Use of informants (who pose as friends but 
actually work for the police) is allowable if that is what 
it takes to catch lawbreakers 
-.20 .03 1.35 1.34 
Q21 - Too often people who commit crimes are given 
too harsh of sentences 
.45 .03 1.00 1.00 
Q22 - The crime rate is so high that we should give the 
police the power to catch criminals, whatever it takes 
.62 .03 1.16 1.17 
Q23 - Police should be allowed to do whatever is 
necessary to catch those who are breaking the law 
.69 .03 1.27 1.27 
Q24 - Police often bend the rules in order to 
strengthen a weak case -.28 .03 .87 .88 
Q25 - All evidence collected against a person, no 
matter how it was collected, should be admissible in 
court 





Vanessa A. Edkins and Kenneth D. Royal 






The item hierarchy investigates the extent 
to which the items rank-order themselves 
in a manner that is consistent with theory. 
The item map presents an illustration of 
the item hierarchy (see Figure 1). Item 
Q18, If the police arrest someone, then 
that person is almost certainly guilty, is 
the most difficult item for respondents to 
endorse, followed by Q23, Police should 
be allowed to do whatever is necessary to 
catch those who are breaking the law, 
and Q22, The crime rate is so high that 
we should give the police the power to 
catch criminals, whatever it takes. Item 
Q4, People with more money are more 
likely to win their trials, is the easiest 
item for respondents to endorse, with 
item Q5, Lawyers will often lie to win 
their case, being the next easiest item. 
Notice, the mean for both person and item 
measures falls almost exactly at 0.0 logits. 
This indicates the average participant in 
this sample would have a 50/50 
probability of endorsing items that 
constitute the average difficulty, namely 
items Q1 and Q8. The probability of 
endorsing an item increases the farther an 
item is located down the map. Likewise, 
the probably of endorsing an item 
decreases the farther an item is located up 
the map. The precision as to how much 
these probabilities increase or decrease is 
contingent upon the location of the person 




Figure 1.  Item Map 
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Person Measure Quality 
 
Person measure quality is determined by 
investigating the stability of the measures, 
the size of their associated standard 
errors, and the extent to which the 
measures are noisy (see Table 4). For this 
sample, the measures are relatively stable. 
The average standard error associated 
with the person measure is about .15, 
indicating acceptable stability. Mean 
square infit and outfit statistics are close 
to the ideal value of 1.0, indicating 
relatively noise-free calibrations. Using 
the .6-1.4 criteria as suggested by Wright 
and Linacre (1994) as reasonable fit 
statistics ranges, person misfit was 
evaluated. Results indicate about 19% of 
the sample misfit the model, which on the 
surface seems fairly large. However, as 
Karabatsos (2000) points out, the 
sampling distribution for the outfit mean 
square is unknown, so this information 
could potentially be misleading. Wright 
and Linacre also point out that only fit 
statistics outside the range of .5-2.0 are 
unproductive or degrading for 
measurement. When considering this 
criteria, only about 8% of the persons 
misfit the RRSM. Rasch practitioners 
regularly remove persons and items who 
misfit the model (Linacre, 2010b). For the 
purposes of this validation study, no 
misfitters were removed. The authors 
chose to retain all the data, including 
those that might be noisy, or otherwise 
problematic. However, in practice, it 
would be perfectly reasonable to remove 
all misfitters from the sample given the 
proportion of misfitters is so small.  
 
Table 4 
Overall Data to Model Fit Statistics 
 
 Measure Model Error INFIT MNSQ OUTFIT MNSQ 
Persons      
   M .01 .15 1.01 1.01 
   SD .29 .00 .56 .57 
Items      
   M .00 .03 1.01 1.01 




In 1989, Messick discussed the notion of 
construct validity as a uniform concept. 
Messick suggests construct validity “is 
based on an integration of any evidence 
that bears on the interpretation or 
meaning of the test scores…” (p. 7). 
Specifically, Messick identified six 
distinguishable aspects that comprise 
construct validity: content, structural, 
substantive, generalizability, external, and 
consequential. When determining the 
construct validity of the GALS scale, it is 
helpful to evaluate the results from this 
perspective.  
 Item quality measures appeared sound 
with the possible exception of one item: 
Q1, In our legal system, everyone receives 
a fair trial. This speaks to the content 
validity aspect. With regards to Q1, 
perhaps the reason that this item misfit 
Vanessa A. Edkins and Kenneth D. Royal 




the model was that it did not adequately 
distinguish between the crime control and 
due process orientation. The item may 
have been interpreted differently by 
different people and even the idea of a 
“fair trial” may have had different 
connotations. If this item stays in the 
GALS scale, future research may want to 
investigate exactly what the roughly 50% 
of individuals have in mind when they 
disagree with the item and denote that 
people are not receiving a fair trial. 
 Each of the rating scale effectiveness 
quality control checks was acceptable and 
evidence was provided that the rating 
scale was functioning appropriately. This 
speaks to the structural aspect of validity. 
Also with regard to the rating scale, there 
appears to be some evidence for 
communicative validity (Lopez, 1996), or 
the extent to which the rating scale 
categories are sufficient and appropriately 
interpreted by respondents. Reliability 
estimates were moderate for persons and 
high for items. These estimates lend 
support for relatively reproducible scores, 
thus speaking to the generalizability 
aspect of validity.  
 With respect to the substantive aspects 
of validity, looking at the item hierarchy 
in Figure 1, it seems that Packer’s (1964) 
vision has garnered support. For example, 
items Q3, Plea-bargaining allows too 
many criminals back on the street; Q9, 
Too often a defendant gets off because of 
technicalities; Q16, It is too easy for a 
violent offender to be paroled; and Q7, 
Too many criminals are given lighter 
sentences than they deserve, are all very 
close together on the item map and all 
four reflect crime control views that the 
current system is too lenient. 
Recall that the “presumption of 
guilt” aspect of the crime control ideology 
discussed by Packer (1964) encompassed 
the idea that if investigations are 
conducted properly and efficiently, we 
should assume the individual charged is 
likely guilty. Looking at the item 
hierarchy, one can see this faith in the 
police and endorsement of increasing 
police power construct as represented by 
the close proximity of three specific items: 
Q18, If the police arrest someone then 
that person is almost certainly guilty, 
Q22, The crime rate is so high that we 
should give the police the power to catch 
criminals, whatever it takes, and Q23, 
Police should be allowed to do whatever 
is necessary to catch those who are 
breaking the law. Interestingly, these 
items were also the most difficult to 
endorse (see Figure 1). The fact that these 
low endorseability items are so similar in 
nature, construct-wise, could tell someone 
a lot about the individual that endorses 
them. That individual would likely be 
more forgiving of police misconduct, if 
that is a component in a trial, and more 
conviction-prone in general. Future 
research will need to address whether 
these questions have predictive validity in 
an actual trial scenario. 
The low endorseability of these 
staunch crime control items may also be 
telling us something about the current 
state of society. Packer (1964) felt that 
throughout history, society moves back 
and forth along the ideological continuum 
between favoring more due process 
initiatives to favoring more crime control 
initiatives. It may be tempting to think 
that the low endorseability of items 
related to a key component of crime 
control—a trust in investigations and 
police to uncover the truth; a belief in the 
factual over legal guilt—mean that we are 
currently a ‘due-process society’ but in 
reality, it may be showing us that the 
relationship is much more complex than 
Packer originally thought. Recall that 
Packer’s ideologies are complex and 
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multi-faceted—another important aspect 
of crime control is distrust in, and a low 
tolerance for, adjudication as well as a 
strong support of punishment as a 
deterrent. The three easiest to endorse 
items show that these beliefs are 
garnering plenty of support: Q4, People 
with more money are more likely to win 
their trials, Q5, Lawyers will often lie to 
win their case, and Q7, Too many 
criminals are given lighter sentences 
than they deserve. Perhaps society can be 
due-process oriented toward some parts 
or players of the legal system while at the 
same time, crime-control oriented when it 
comes to others. 
The substantive validity of the 
GALS scale is further buttressed by the 
apparent acknowledgement of the 
cynicism inherent in a due process 
ideology. Packer’s conception of a due 
process perspective included a certain 
amount of cynicism or distrust of the legal 
system and its players; an anti-
authoritarian view that the system was 
biased. Three items very close together on 
the item hierarchy reflect this perspective, 
Q6, Prosecutors are only concerned with 
their conviction rates, Q11, Police often 
overstep their boundaries when pursuing 
a suspect, and Q24, Police often bend the 
rules in order to strengthen a weak case. 
These items were about mid-range for 
endorseability. 
We provide no evidence for the 
external or consequential aspects of 
validity, although these facets are 
certainly important. Future research with 
the GALS scale will assess Differential 
Item Functioning (DIF) across various 
demographic characteristics to test for 
item bias, thus addressing the systematic 
validity of the scores. And while our 
validity assessments presented here offer 
a solid argument for the generalizeability 
of our results, future research should 
assess the structure of the GALS scale 




The due process and crime control model 
offers an excellent theoretical basis for 
differentiating between jurors by their 
beliefs about the state and purpose of the 
criminal justice system. Packer’s (1964) 
proposal of the model, and subsequent 
interpretations (Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 
1984; Thompson et al., 1984; Liu & Shure, 
1993), offers predictions for individual 
differences at every level of the criminal 
justice system. The current paper presents 
one of the first empirical attempts to 
assess the true content and structure of 
the perspectives. We have low 
endorseability items that seem to reflect a 
crime control orientation expressing faith 
in the police and their actions. Individuals 
endorsing these items may differ from 
other potential jurors in their 
interpretation—and subsequent 
acceptance—of questionable police 
behaviors in an investigation. We also 
have due process orientation items that 
seem to express cynicism toward the 
justice system. Individuals endorsing 
these items are explicitly stating that 
police should not be trusted and may 
interpret some trial evidence in a manner 
opposite the first group.  
Unlike most other IRT models, 
Rasch models do not require normally 
distributed data. However, when data 
happen to be relatively normally 
distributed researchers can make 
inferences at the summative level. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, data for the present 
study are rather normally distributed. 
Therefore, we can make inferences about 
how the average person feels about the 
criminal justice system. This last point is 
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why expanding the study beyond our 
current sample could help attorneys or 
trial consultants in planning trial strategy. 
If we know that the average person is 
highly unlikely to endorse an item that 
states, “Police should be allowed to do 
whatever is necessary to catch those who 
are breaking the law,” then the defense 
would want to highlight any police 
missteps in an investigation and the 
prosecution should work to explain away 
or downplay any questionable police 
actions. On the other hand, knowing that 
the average person is very likely to 
endorse the statement, “People with more 
money are more likely to win their trials,” 
suggests some trial strategy possibilities 
as well. Perhaps the defense attorneys of a 
well-off client would want to keep their 
client looking ‘ordinary’ – avoid outwardly 
flashy dress and have only one or two 
lawyers sitting with the client (opposed to 
a ‘dream team’), for example. Prosecutors, 
on the other hand, would likely want to 
accentuate the obvious resources of the 
client whenever possible. Expanding the 
current study to include a more diverse 
population in terms of age, ethnicity, and 
geographical location, can further 
highlight how the average U.S. jury-
eligible citizen feels about the criminal 
justice system and its players. 
While trial-specific material will 
always be the best predictor of verdicts, 
and rightfully so, juror bias does play a 
role, especially in cases with a certain 
degree of ambiguity. Since the vast 
majority of cases in the United States 
never make it to trial, one could infer that 
those for which a jury is formed are those 
with some question of whether or not the 
defendant is actually guilty. Measuring 
individual differences regarding the “is” 
and “ought” (Packer, 1964) of the purpose 
of legal system may help us understand 
why those two jurors, sitting side-by-side, 
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